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To many people the connection between the law and ethics is an obvious one. For 
laypersons, if asked to name a law most would instantly refer to the ‘big ones’. In criminal 
law this would be Rape, Murder, Assaults and Theft and in civil this would most likely be 
Negligence, all of which have an ethical basis. For those who give further thought, laws 
pertaining no ethical basis become clear, for example the offence of selling a lottery ticket 
to a minor. The majority of these laws are based on regulation and preventing a social harm. 
The situation is far more difficult to justify, however, where there is an ethical basis behind 
the law but the law takes the opposite view. 
An extremely succinct example is provided by Brazier and Cave[1]. Doctors and Nurses are 
under no legal duty to provide assistance if they witness a road accident, they can pass by 
without a fear of legal sanction. However, if they were to do so they have breached the 
ethical principle of beneficence. Thus it is clear that legally a far lower standard is expected 
of them.  
Causation, Loss of Chance approach and the Gregg v. Scott decision 
The law of causation is extremely complex and by far beyond the ambit of this polemic to 
discuss in full. Rather I will look at one aspect of causation within the context of Clinical 
Negligence. In this context of causation, it must be shown that a medical professional’s 
breach of duty of care was either the cause of the injury or a significant factor bringing 
about that injury. It must be shown as both a factual and a legal cause. Factually it must be 
shown that ‘but for’ the breach the injury would not have occurred and legally that the 
damage suffered was not too remote.  
Causation is never a straightforward element for a claimant to prove in an action for Clinical 
Negligence. It must be ‘more likely than not’ that the doctor brought about the harm rather 
than it being something that would have happened anyway. This brings us onto cases where 
the harm suffered is claimed to be the ‘loss of chance’. Quite simply this means that the 
claimant has lost the opportunity to have been treated differently. The majority of the cases 
on this point arise where a doctor’s misdiagnosis deprives his patient of the chance to 
recover from his ailment. The law stems from the Court of Appeal decision in Hotson v. East 
Berkshire AHA[2] in which it was held that a claimant must establish that there was a 
greater than 50% chance of complete recovery had the defendant not been in breach.  
In 2004 a ‘loss of chance’ case reached the, as it was then, UK House of Lords. The case was 
Gregg v. Scott[3] and involved a GPs failure to diagnose his patient’s lymphoma. In the delay 
of one year before being treated the patient’s survival chances dropped from 42% to 25%. 
Their Lordships found, by a majority of three to two, in favour of affirming the Hotson 
decision and that the claimant had to prove that on a balance of probabilities the breach of 
duty was the cause. Lord Hoffmann of the majority stated that to adopt ‘possible causation’ 
would be such a radical change as to require legislation.  
It is submitted that their Lordships for the majority were misguided in their decision for the 
following reasons. It appears at first as though the decision is one based in law rather than 
ethics. It certainly is not an ethical decision, as will be discussed below, but nor is it of 
sufficient basis in law. First, the decision fails to take into account the thin skull rule 
(essentially ‘you must take your victim as you find him’ [4]), which is another element of 
causation. A doctor is now allowed to negligently misdiagnose any patient that confronts 
him with a sub-50% chance of survival. He can now say, if an action is brought against him, 
“I could not have been negligent, even if he has suffered a drop in his survival prospects, as 
it was more likely than not that he would die before I misdiagnosed him”. 
Second, the claimants case, and therein the doctor’s duty owed to him, rests solely on his 
pre-existing condition. The claimant can recover not on the basis of the harm suffered but 
on the state of his ailment at the time of the negligence. The effect being that a patient 
suffering at 10% drop in survival chances from 90% has a claim whereas a patient suffering a 
40% loss of survival chances from 45% has no claim. This is so despite the fact that both 
have suffered harm and in truth the loss to the latter is far, far greater. One may perceive 
the law as backwards in this respect. It treats those less likely to survive as having no chance 
and thus any loss of chance as insignificant. Whereas in reality the less likely one is to 
survive the more important each per cent of chance will mean to that person.  
Third, it is unclear why the balance of probabilities is required to apply to that aspect. It, in 
practice, fails to prove that harm is attributable to the actions of the doctor. The culpability 
of the doctor’s actions could have been assessed by asking whether on a balance of 
probabilities the failure to diagnose caused the loss of X% chance of survival. One may argue 
that this would significantly increase NHS liability but this would be in error. It would still 
need to be established that the doctor was in breach of his duty and it is submitted that that 
is a better method of determining liability than finding breach but requiring a probability of 
survival beforehand.  
The dissenting judgment of Lord Nicholls is an extremely powerful one, clearly he finds the 
decision as absurd as many commentators do, describing the approach as “irrational and 
indefensible”. Due to the ‘all-or-nothing’ nature of causation, a claimant is either able to 
prove the breach was a significant cause or he cannot and thus has a claim or has not. His 
Lordship condemned the use of the approach in hypothetical cases, where the breach has 
precluded factual circumstances from materialising. It is submitted that if an approach 
whereby a ‘balance of probabilities’ had to be included, the correct approach would have 
been to require a loss of at least 50% (though this would still prove unjust). 
What would the state of the law be had the case been decided ethically? 
Rather obviously the doctor has failed to act beneficently; his negligence has caused harm 
to the patient regardless of the definition of that harm. Furthermore, the ethical principle of 
non-maleficence has not been followed. Even on the ‘balancing’ approach to non-
maleficence, where harm is weighed against the benefit it gives, it is impossible to justify. It 
may even be said that in failing to provide the correct diagnosis at the time the patient’s 
autonomy has been compromised. The negligence of the doctor prevents the patient from 
ever making a decision as to treatment at that time. Instead he can only make a choice 
when circumstances have changed. 
Therefore, arguably, the three most important principles directing the actions of medical 
professionals have not been followed. Were the law to approach the issue in this way, 
Gregg v. Scott would undoubtedly have been decided in favour of the claimant? Even if we 
accept that the law need not hold a standard as high as is held ethically, it is hard to justify 
there being no redress for the claimant.  
Conclusion 
The approach adopted in relation to these ‘loss of chance’ cases is clearly controversial. For 
the reasons discussed I believe this is because it lacks merit. Not only is it in practice absent 
of the legal basis it claims to have, it also permits ethical ‘wrongs’. The unfortunate 
consequence of the decision is that doctors no longer owe a duty to correctly (as in ‘non-
negligently’) diagnose those with less than a 50% prospect of recovery; and that patient is 
unable to claim redress for any breach of the fictional duty.  
Adopting a measure of quantifying the loss in order to calculate damages in relation to the 
injury would not be so radical as to require legislation. It could be used relatively easily and 
the law would instantly be far more ‘fair’. If Parliament were firmly opposed to the change 
they would be in a position to draft legislation to remove the ruling and it seems unlikely 
that they would reinstate a law that is clearly unjust. We would be afforded the best 
possible law.  
Though ethics do not necessarily come into every piece of law, where they are present they 
should be taken account of. Actions which are clearly unethical in numerous ways should 
not be condoned, they should be outlawed, and it is the duty of the judiciary to do so. 
Failing to do so and hiding behind the mask of legal confines is merely opportunistic. In this 
writers view, the Supreme Court should be praying for the chance to hear another ‘loss of 
chance’ case as soon as possible so that the majority is allowed an opportunity to make up 
for their error.  
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